Peronism and Javier Milei president of Argentina
When Javier Milei was elected president in 2023, Argentina was drowning. Annual inflation had exceeded 200 percent, the highest level in three decades. More than 40 percent of the population lived in poverty, and public trust in the political class was near zero. For many Argentines, this was not just another economic crisis — it was the culmination of years of corruption, repeated defaults, and governments unable or unwilling to break the cycle.
Peronism had dominated Argentine politics for much of the past 80 years. Rooted in the legacy of Juan Domingo Perón, who was elected in 1946, re-elected in 1951, ousted by a coup in 1955, and returned for a final term in 1973, it became a movement defined less by strict ideology and more by loyalty to Perón, his wife Evita, and the image of a strong, protective state. For decades, Peronism reinvented itself — sometimes leaning left, sometimes right — but always maintaining control of unions, subsidies, and state power.
At its core, Peronism blended nationalism, social justice, and populism. Perón expanded workers’ rights, raised wages, and elevated unions into a central role. These moves improved living standards in the short term but came at a cost: inflation, fiscal deficits, and structural inefficiency. His governments relied on state control of key industries, protectionism, and subsidies to sustain the promise of dignity for workers and the poor. Evita reinforced this by building direct ties to the marginalized, particularly women and the working class, creating a movement that was as emotional as it was political. Argentina’s 20th-century history also featured repeated military coups — sometimes against Peronist governments, sometimes against their opponents — feeding a cycle of instability that kept institutions weak and public trust fragile.
By the 21st century, Peronism had splintered into factions but still shaped the political landscape. Under Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, it took a left-populist form, fueled by commodity exports and heavy subsidies. When the export boom ended, inflation surged, poverty rose, and corruption scandals mounted. Mauricio Macri, a non-Peronist elected in 2015, promised stability and gradual reform but left office with debt, currency collapse, and recession. By 2019, Peronism returned under Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirchner, but the problems only worsened: inflation skyrocketed, the peso collapsed, and poverty deepened. By 2023, Argentines had lived through decades of promises, none of them fulfilled.
Milei’s rise must be seen in this context. He was not a career politician but an economist and media figure who attacked the “political caste” in language more blunt than Argentines were used to hearing. His program was radical: abolish the central bank, explore dollarization, slash ministries from 18 to 9, deregulate markets, and end subsidies. He framed his campaign as war against parasites feeding on the public. For millions of Argentines, especially younger voters who had only ever known instability, his message was not reckless but refreshing. Incremental reform had been tried and failed. Breaking the system felt like the only option.
Resistance came instantly. Deregulation and subsidy cuts pushed prices for food, fuel, and transport even higher in the short term. Unions mobilized strikes. Governors demanded funds from Buenos Aires. Courts sought to block his decrees. Milei was not surprised — he knew entrenched interests would not surrender quietly. In his eyes, the backlash only confirmed the depth of Argentina’s rot.
Internationally, he shifted Argentina’s stance. Milei distanced himself from China and Brazil, despite their role as the country’s largest trading partners, and emphasized alignment with the United States and free-market allies. He cast this not just as diplomacy but as ideology: liberty versus authoritarianism.
Milei’s presidency represents a gamble. If his policies succeed — if inflation falls, the peso stabilizes, and growth returns — he could reshape Argentina’s trajectory after decades of stagnation. If they fail, the country risks deeper poverty, sharper inequality, and yet another cycle of disillusionment. What is clear is that his election was not an accident. It was the product of decades of economic decline, political betrayal, and a society willing to risk rupture rather than endure more of the same.
For Milei, there is no middle ground. Argentina will either break its cycle of crisis or fall further into it. His presidency is not just another chapter in Argentine politics — it is a confrontation with its entire Peronist history.